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Crop Insurance and Soybean Rust
Matthew Diersen, Extension risk and business management specialist

Soybean rust is a production risk covered under
standard crop insurance products. If producers take reasonable steps to prevent and control any damage and
still face sizable yield reductions, then the insurance
pays an indemnity on lost bushels.

enue insurance products that respectively covered 5%
and 83% of soybean acres. Producers bought RA on the
largest share of acres because of its favorable price
level compared to the yield products and its lower cost
relative to CRC.

Widespread yield losses from soybean rust at the
national level could increase prices, a risk for producers
who forward price their crop. In South Dakota, producers insure a vast majority of soybean acres and tend to
use relatively high levels of coverage. Understanding
the typical kinds and levels of coverage gives insights
into how to manage the production and price risks from
soybean rust.

The 2006 price elections are $5.15 per bushel for
yield products and $6.18 per bushel for revenue products and would be the prices paid on production to
count. Thus, producers had a strong incentive to again
purchase revenue products in 2006.
Two county-level policy types, Group Risk
Protection (GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection
(GRIP) cover yield and revenue declines, respectively.
GRIP has an optional harvest-price feature, making it
similar to RA.

Common Product Choice

A single GRP policy for soybeans was recorded in
2005 in South Dakota. Nationally, however, soybean
producers covered 4.58 million acres under GRP and
GRIP, with the heaviest use in Illinois and Indiana. A
handful of GRP and GRIP policies were sold in South
Dakota in 2006.

The important issue for producers (and their advisors) is to understand the insurance coverage they purchased. Coverage is available in counties in the eastern
half of South Dakota. Growers in South Dakota pick
their coverage types and levels by March 15 but do not
report acres insured until after planting. The June acreage
report shows South Dakota farmers planted 3.80 million
acres to soybeans in 2006. Policy sales data show product choice and coverage patterns similar to 2005.

Common Election Level

The National Agricultural Statistics Service reports
that South Dakota producers planted 3.90 million acres
in 2005. The Risk Management Agency, which oversees
crop insurance, reports that South Dakota producers
purchased insurance on 3.86 million acres. Thus, only
1% of the acres went without insurance.

In addition to the choice of product, producers
choose an optimal yield election coverage level. Actual
yields need to be below the coverage level before the
insurance pays any indemnity. Soybean producers in
South Dakota typically purchase policies with high coverage levels. In 2005 producers covered only 21% of
soybean acres in South Dakota at the 65% level or less.
They covered 48% of the acres at the 70% level and the
remaining 31% at the 75% or higher level.

South Dakota producers covered their acres with
one of four farm-level policies: Catastrophic (CAT),
Multiple Peril (MPCI), Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC),
or Revenue Assurance (RA) in 2005. CAT and MPCI
are yield insurance products that covered 1% and 10%
of soybean acres, respectively. CRC and RA are rev-

The 75% level, for example, means producers
insure 75% of their proven (historical) yields. If a producer has a proven yield of 40 bu/A and buys 75% cov1

erage, he would not receive any indemnity payment
unless actual yield was below 30 bu/A. The deductible
amount means the producer bears the full financial
responsibility for the other 25%.

insufficient or improper application of disease control
measures.”
A producer with insurance could potentially be better off financially with a low yield and high indemnity
payment relative to the cost of managing a peril.
Insurance companies are concerned about “moral hazard” where the insured producers might act in their own
self-interest to the detriment of the insurance company
in the short run and the insurance product viability in
the long run.

Ironically, the Economic Research Service (ERS)
estimates that not treating a rust-infected field may
result in a yield loss of 25%. With typical insurance
coverage, a yield loss would not generally be enough to
trigger insurance payments, even with the high coverage levels purchased in South Dakota. The ERS estimates that a field receiving a preventative treatment for
rust would only suffer a 1% yield loss. The ERS also
estimates that treating an infected field would likely
result in a 7% yield loss. Thus, producers will use the
market value of any bushels at risk to evaluate the costs
to scout for and treat rust.

Insured producers are obligated to use “good farming practices” to maintain eligibility. Good farming
practices are discussed in the crop policies in a general
way and are determined by local agricultural experts.
When insurance companies talk about good farming
practices they say producers should make “good faith
efforts” and take “reasonable” measures to reach the
insured level of production.

Ability to Price

In other words, if an effective control measure were
available, then the producer would be expected to use
the measure to maintain insurance against loss associated with the peril.

Producers often hesitate to forward price or hedge
a large portion of their expected production. Nationally, the ERS reported that producers in 2003 only
forward priced 13.6% of the value of soybean production by using marketing contracts.

Will producers have to spray to prevent/control
soybean rust, regardless of cost and regardless of the
condition of the crop? In the event that a crop has
already been damaged by drought, hail, or other perils
the producer could forgo treatment if any additional
indemnity does not make treatment look cost effective.

Soybean rust may cause producers to fear a yield
loss on their operations, causing them to forgo pricing
opportunities. If rust threatens other production
regions of the country, producers may forgo pricing
opportunities, fearing an eventual spread of the disease
to their areas. In the event of substantial yield loss and
higher prices, hedging or pricing losses could exceed
any insurance indemnity payment.

Producers will want to work closely with their crop
insurance agents to assure compliance with their policies. The regulatory requirements are such that documentation is a key management device when dealing
with soybean rust or any similar peril. Prudence suggests producers should document scouting for and any
discovery of rust. Producers should also track treatment recommendations and actions to assure that coverage remains sound.

The concern about hedging losses is mitigated with
the use of revenue insurance. CRC, RA with the harvest price option, and GRIP with the harvest price
option have indemnity payments tied to the greater of
spring and harvest price levels. Producers with these
coverage types can prudently forward price a percentage of their crops.
The extent of price increases from rust outbreaks is
difficult to estimate. The ERS reported that a minimal
outbreak would likely increase soybean prices by less
than 1%. A moderate outbreak would likely increase
prices by less than 3% while a large outbreak would
likely increase prices by just over 6%.
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Documenting Good Farming Practices
The crop insurance policies list plant disease as a
cause of loss with the caveat “but not damage due to
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